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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1420 
_____________ 
 
GEORGE J. PISARZ, JR., 
                                             Appellant 
v. 
 
PPL CORPORATION  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 4-10-cv-01432) 
District Judge:  Hon. Matthew W. Brann 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2015 
 
Before:   SMITH, JORDAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 24, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant George Pisarz asks us to reverse an order of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania compelling enforcement of a settlement 
agreement with his former employer PPL Corporation (“PPL”).  We will affirm.   
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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I. Background 
 In 2008, Pisarz stopped working at PPL due to a work-related injury for which he 
obtained worker’s compensation benefits in 2010.  Pisarz initiated an employment 
discrimination action against PPL in 2010 in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and 
age.  He retained the law firm of Kolman Ely, P.C., to represent him in the litigation.  
Attorney Laura Siegle, an associate at Kolman Ely, initially handled the case.  She had 
both in-person and telephonic conversations with Pisarz regarding settlement.  According 
to Siegle’s testimony before the District Court, Pisarz never informed her that he would 
not resign or retire in connection with any settlement or that he wanted his pension and 
insurance benefits to continue after the case was settled.1  On September 12, 2012, 
following consultation with Pisarz, Siegle made a settlement demand on PPL for 
$250,000.  After she made the demand, Pisarz called her at her office and directed her to 
double the demand to $500,000, which she did.  Pisarz concedes that the demands were 
in terms of “money only” and that he never placed any other conditions on the demands.  
(App. at 89-90.)  Siegle informed Pisarz that his pension would continue to accrue  “until 
the date of settlement.”  (App. at 25.)  After PPL rejected the initial demand, Siegle made 
another “money only” demand for $300,000, as authorized by Pisarz.   
                                              
 1 In moving for the enforcement of the settlement agreement, PPL sought the 
production of certain documents over which Pisarz attempted to claim attorney-client 
privilege.  The District Court ruled, however, that by denying he provided his attorneys 
with the authority to settle the case, Pisarz had placed the attorney-client communications 
at issue.  (District Docket Entry No. 104.)  That ruling has not been challenged on appeal.  
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 The parties attended a settlement conference with the Honorable Yvette Kane at 
which Siegle communicated a purely financial settlement demand to PPL in front of 
Pisarz and Judge Kane.  Pisarz did not object to the demand, express concerns about the 
pension, or indicate that Siegle lacked authority to settle the case.   
 Pisarz became difficult for Siegle to deal with, so Timothy Kolman, another 
attorney at Kolman Ely, took control of the case against PPL.  Kolman testified that 
Pisarz never informed him that he would not resign or retire in connection with any 
settlement or that he wanted his pension and insurance benefits to continue after the case 
was settled.  Pisarz rebuffed Kolman’s attempts to discuss the case against PPL, 
prompting Kolman to send a letter to Pisarz in October 2012 in which Kolman 
admonished Pisarz that “[y]ou simply do not seem to listen or accept any of our advice 
and you are not interested in understanding the laws and principles that apply to your 
case.”  (App. at 193.)  In that letter, Kolman told Pisarz that “[t]his firm, through great 
efforts, has persuaded Defendant PPL to pay the significant sum of $125,000.  They have 
agreed to full pension accrual (as though you had been working to date.).”  (Id. at 191.)  
Kolman further cautioned Pisarz that “the firm is ... of the belief that it cannot ethically 
proceed in representing you by making demands of [PPL] that far exceed your damages 
and which are not based in law, logic, or fact.”  (Id. at 193.)  Finally, Kolman wrote that 
the firm was not “a vessel through which you may pursue vexatious litigation in order to 
satisfy any personal vendetta you may have against PPL ... .”  (Id.)   
 A few days after sending the letter, Kolman and Pisarz spoke by phone and 
discussed settlement with PPL.  Pisarz manifested an understanding that his pension 
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would accrue up to the date of settlement, which would also be the date of his retirement.  
Kolman recorded the end of the telephone call, in which he confirmed that he and Pisarz 
had discussed the case and that Pisarz was giving Kolman the authority to settle the case 
for a minimum of $125,000.  No reference was made to pension terms or continued 
employment with PPL.   
 On October 11, 2012, Kolman and PPL reached a verbal agreement to settle 
Pisarz’s case for $145,000 and certain other standard terms.  The attorney for PPL 
memorialized the terms in an email and sent them to Kolman, who replied “This is 
confirmed.” 2  (App. at 239.)  The next day, Kolman sent Pisarz a letter informing him 
that his “case is resolved for $145,000 including the pension portion previously 
communicated.”  (App. at 240.)  The letter also made reference to a previous 
conversation with Pisarz’s wife in which Kolman relayed the settlement terms.  Pisarz 
responded to that communication by sending a letter to Kolman on October 18, 2012, 
asking for the settlement agreement to be clarified to state that his “pension will continue 
to accrue as it was prior to the lawsuit.”  (App. at 252.)  Kolman understood that letter to 
                                              
 2 In pertinent part, PPL’s email read:  
 
Please allow this e-mail to confirm Mr. Pisarz’s acceptance of PPL’s 
settlement offer of $145,000 (one hundred forty five thousand dollars) in 
full and complete settlement of any and all claims, including claims for 
attorney’s fees, interest, costs, etc. Mr. Pisarz will also receive pension 
credit for years of service from 2008 through the date of agreement (which 
will be deemed his retirement/resignation date). Mr. Pisarz’s acceptance of 
this offer includes the execution of a general release and settlement 
agreement, which we will prepare, as well as all non-financial terms and 
conditions previously discussed. 
 
(App. at 239.) 
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request that the PPL settlement provide that Pisarz’s pension would continue to accrue to 
the date of settlement because that is what he had previously discussed with Pisarz.  
Thus, he did not take any action in response to the letter, as that provision was already 
contained in the settlement agreement.  PPL’s attorney notified the court that the matter 
had been resolved by the parties subject to the execution of a settlement agreement.  On 
November 7, 2012, PPL forwarded to Kolman a copy of the settlement agreement, which 
Pisarz refused to sign.  Pisarz objected to the agreement because it required him to retire 
as of the date he executed the settlement agreement and his pension credit would continue 
to accrue only through that date.   
 On December 28, 2012, PPL moved to enforce the settlement agreement.  The 
District Court denied the motion and scheduled an evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, 
Siegle, Kolman, and Pisarz testified.  After the hearing, the District Court granted PPL’s 
motion to enforce the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.   
II. Discussion3 
 Pisarz raises three objections to the District Court’s enforcement of the settlement 
agreement: (1) that the Court erred in applying the standard for apparent authority rather 
than actual authority, (2) that the Court erred in holding that settlement was not 
conditioned upon Pisarz’s signature, and (3) that the Court’s factual findings were clearly 
erroneous because they omitted several key facts.  None of those objections has merit.    
                                              
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s factual 
findings for clear error and we review its legal determinations de novo.  Tiernan v. 
Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031, 1032-33 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1991).   
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 A. Standard for Express Authority 
  The law in Pennsylvania “is clear and well-settled that an attorney must have 
express authority in order to bind a client to a settlement agreement.”  Reutzel v. Douglas, 
870 A.2d 787, 789-90 (Pa. 2005).4  “The rationale for [that] rule stems from the fact that 
parties settling legal disputes forfeit substantial legal rights, and such rights should only 
be forfeited knowingly.”  Id. at 790.  Accordingly “a client’s attorney may not settle a 
case without the client’s grant of express authority, and such express authority can only 
exist where the principal specifically grants the agent the authority to perform a certain 
task on the principal’s behalf.”  Id.  (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 cmt. c 
(1958)). 
 Pisarz argues that, because the District Court cited to Comment b of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7, it improperly used the standard for apparent 
authority rather than for express authority.  We disagree.  First, the District Court cited to 
Comment b only for the proposition that, if an attorney obtains the client’s express 
authority to settle a case but the client maintains some secret or unexpressed reservation 
or belief, “attorneys are not expected to be telepathists.”  (App. at 253.)  Further, the 
District Court found, after conducting an evidentiary hearing and reviewing all of the 
                                              
 4 We apply Pennsylvania law to the enforceability of the parties’ settlement 
agreement.  Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 & n.6.  “The enforceability of settlement 
agreements is governed by principles of contract law.”  Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 
536 (Pa. 1999).  “As with any contract, it is essential to the enforceability of a settlement 
agreement that the minds of the parties should meet upon all the terms, as well as the 
subject-matter, of the [agreement].”  Id.  “Where the parties have agreed on the essential 
terms of a contract, the fact that they intend to formalize their agreement in writing but 
have not yet done so does not prevent enforcement of such agreement.”  Id.   
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evidence, that “Pisarz granted Kolman Ely express authority to reach the October 11, 
2012 settlement with PPL.” (App. at 254.)  Based on the record presented to us, that 
factual finding is not clearly erroneous.   
 Even if the District Court had applied the incorrect legal standard, we conclude on 
the facts presented here that Pisarz granted Kolman express authority to settle his case 
with PPL.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (we may affirm a 
district court for any reason supported by the record).  Pisarz expressly authorized his 
attorneys to settle his claim for a lump sum and, indeed, one such settlement demand was 
made in his presence.  Both Siegle and Kolman testified that Pisarz never indicated a 
desire to remain on the payroll at PPL or to have his pension continue to accrue 
indefinitely.   The record here, taken as a whole, indicates that Pisarz previously and 
repeatedly sought to change his settlement demands, but his past inconstancy is no 
defense to the agreement he finally authorized.  “Having second thoughts about the 
results of a valid settlement agreement does not justify setting [it] aside.”  Hensley v. 
Alcon Labs., Inc., 277 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 2002) (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Pisarz offered only his own conflicting and unsupported testimony to 
rebut the substantial evidence that he gave express authority to his attorneys.  
Accordingly, his effort to avoid the results of the exercise of that express authority fails.  
 B.  Signed Agreement 
 Pisarz next argues that the settlement agreement is invalid because its 
enforceability was conditioned upon his signature, which he refused to provide.  He is 
wrong.  “An agreement to settle a lawsuit, voluntarily entered into, is binding upon the 
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parties, whether or not made in the presence of the Court, and even in the absence of a 
writing.”  Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 726 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Pennsylvania law provides that, when the parties 
have agreed on the essential terms of a contract, the fact that they intend to formalize 
their agreement in writing but have not yet done so does not prevent enforcement.  E.g., 
Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 298 (3d Cir. 
1986) (applying Pennsylvania law).  Even the inability of the parties to reduce their 
agreement to writing after several attempts does not necessarily preclude a finding that 
their oral agreement was enforceable.  Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999). 
 Here, the parties agreed that PPL would make a $145,000 payment to Pisarz in 
exchange for, inter alia, his releasing PPL from further liability.  The parties confirmed 
the terms of the settlement in an email exchange between Kolman and PPL’s attorney.  
The language of the email between counsel, while not necessary to our holding that a 
valid, binding settlement agreement existed, makes unambiguously clear that Kolman, 
acting on Pisarz’s behalf, accepted PPL’s offer to settle the case on a set of enumerated 
and definite terms and that there was valid consideration.  Grossman, 795 F.2d at 299 
(“Applying Pennsylvania law, then, we must ask (1) whether both parties manifested an 
intention to be bound by the agreement; (2) whether the terms of the agreement are 
sufficiently definite to be enforced; and (3) whether there was consideration.”).   Nothing 
in the record or in the exchanges between the parties suggests that Pisarz’s signing of the 
agreement was a condition precedent to the agreement.  See Wineburgh v. Wineburgh, 
816 A.2d 1105, 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“While the parties to a contract need not 
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utilize any particular words to create a condition precedent, an act or event designated in 
a contract will not be construed as constituting one unless that clearly appears to have 
been the parties’ intention.” (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted)).  The 
settlement documents rather were to memorialize the terms of an already-reached 
agreement, and Pisarz’s obligation to sign the release was part of what he had agreed to 
do. 
 C.   Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings 
 Finally, Pisarz contends that the District Court erred in its factual findings by 
“fail[ing] to make certain findings pertaining to undisputed facts.”  (Opening Br. at 23 
(emphasis omitted).)  Specifically,  Pisarz argues that the District Court failed to find that 
(1) neither Siegel nor Kolman fully understood the ramifications of the agreement with 
PPL on Pisarz’s pension accruals, health insurance, and worker’s compensation; (2) 
Pisarz’s attorneys did not advise him that accepting the agreement would lead to PPL’s 
decreasing his worker’s compensation benefits; (3) his worker’s compensation benefits 
would have increased over time; (4) Pisarz provided undisputed testimony that PPL 
would pay for his health insurance as long as he was on worker’s compensation; (5) 
Pisarz continually “chopped and changed” his demands; (6) Kolman advised Pisarz that if 
he continued being dilatory in signing the agreement PPL may file a motion to compel; 
(7) the settlement offer required Pisarz to execute various documents; (8) PPL’s letter to 
the District Court indicated the case was settled subject to the execution of a settlement 
agreement; (9) PPL’s attorney sent to Kolman a copy of the settlement agreement; and 
(10) the settlement agreement contained a revocation provision, allowing Pisarz to revoke 
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the settlement agreement up to seven days after he executed it.  (Opening Br. at 23-26.)  
None of those claimed omissions from the District Court’s fact-finding are a basis for the 
relief Pisarz seeks. 
 The Court’s ruling makes clear that it appreciated that Pisarz continually “chopped 
and changed” his demands, that PPL’s letter to the District Court indicated the case was 
settled subject to the execution of a settlement agreement, that PPL’s attorney sent to 
Kolman a copy of the settlement agreement, and that the settlement agreement contained 
a revocation provision.  Thus, those facts were not omitted, and there is no error, clear or 
otherwise.  Moreover, while the remaining assertions of fact, if true, may reveal 
something about Pisarz’s view of the quality of Kolman Ely’s work or the wisdom of his 
continuing to pursue his lawsuit, they are not relevant to whether he gave his express 
authority to enter into the settlement agreement or to whether his signature was a 
condition precedent to the agreement.   Accordingly, there is no basis to say that the 
District Court clearly erred in failing to mention legally irrelevant facts, even assuming 
that they are facts.  
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
